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1. Context and teleology: an effective judicial protection as 
European Union general principle and fundamental right
Effective judicial protection comes, in light of  the European Union (EU) law, as 
a general principle that received concrete consecration in Article 19(1) and (2) of  the 
Treaty of  the European Union (TEU). For that matter, it stands for the ability that 
all must go to court in order to exercise a right or to demand a conduct/abstention 
from another. When it relates to EU law themes, it states that someone can appear 
before the European courts (both organic and national courts when the latter applies 
EU law) to “uphold a right conferred to a litigant by Union law”.1 It directly relates to a 
jurisdictional approach that all legal orders must allow and it permits to approach 
one of  the major characteristics that make the EU a Union based on the rule of  law. 
As recognised by Alessandra Silveira, “[t]he EU creates law and is bound by the 
law that it itself  creates” since it has “1) its own institutions; 2) procedures that aim to set and 
interpret European rules; 3) mechanisms which sanction its eventual violation”2 – this allows 
us to describe EU as an Union based on the rule of  law because “the Union’s public 
power’s exercise must be submitted to the law”.3 In this matter, the EU also relies on “its own 
procedural system” with “jurisdictional mechanisms and courts that secure the judicial protection”.4
However, looking at the 2nd paragraph of  the Article 19(1) of  the TEU, we find 
the following legal provision: “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective 
legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”. From this statement, we can derive that 
effective judicial protection relates, in a closer sense, to another EU general principle: 
the principle of  National Procedural Autonomy.5 
The principle of  National Procedural Autonomy made clear that is it up to 
Member States to create all necessary judicial means and legal procedures that can 
be used to enforce/recognise rights derived from EU law. In fact, since the Rewe 
judgement, the CJEU described the principle: “in the absence of  [Union] rules on the 
subject, it is for the domestic legal system of  each Member State to designate the courts having 
jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure 
the protection of  the rights which citizens have from […] [Union] law”.6 
So, in effect, the Rewe principle states that it is the Member States, themselves, 
that determine effective judicial protection, using their own procedural rules. 
However, procedural autonomy demands limits, which will be set under the “test-
principles” of  equivalence and effectiveness (in a strict sense). 
The principle of  equivalence will allow us to test if  national procedural solutions 
are not “less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions”.7 This test demands, so 
far, situations’ comparability and not a complete identity. When it is not possible to 
establish a comparison, this test will be seen as passed. 
1 See Anthony Arnull, “The principle of  an effective judicial protection in EU law: an unruly horse?”, 
European Law Review, Volume 36, n.º 1, February, Sweet & Maxwell (2011), 51. 
2 See Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito da União Europeia – Doutrina e Jurisprudência, (2.ª Edição 
actualizada e ampliada, Colecção Erasmus – ensaios & monografias, Quid Juris, 2011), 28 (free 
translation). 
3 See Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito, 28 (free translation). 
4 See Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito, 29 (free translation).  
5 First references made to this particular principle came from CJEU’s judgement Rewe, 16 December 
1976, case 33/76. 
6 See CJEU’s judgement Rewe, recital 2. 
7 See, among others, CJEU’s judgement Unibet, 13 March 2007, case C-432/05, recital 43. 
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The principle of  effectiveness will allow us to test if  those national procedural 
solutions render “practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of  rights conferred by 
[Union] law”.8 If  so, national rules must be set aside in order to national judge be able 
to recognise and enforce rights derived from EU law.
As we can understand – not only in a literal sense, but also in a teleological one 
– both effective judicial protection and procedural autonomy have a close relation, 
working together towards the same goal: to create the necessary environment so 
national judicial structures feel engaged on developing and pursuing European 
solutions, using national procedural means in a perspective of  close application of  
EU law. 
In this sense, the principle of  effective judicial protection can be applicable “to 
both the Union judicature and to the national courts of  the Member States”9 – it is, in fact, from 
this synergy that we are able to unravel our context in order to understand the idea 
of  a Union’s inter-jurisdictionality, which allocates implicit means of  constitutionality 
control.
Furthermore, effective judicial protection also received literal consecration as 
a fundamental right, in Article 47 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the 
European Union (CFREU). For that matter, we can find, in its three paragraphs, 
several dimensions inserted in the scope of  effective judicial protection: the right 
to action (in the 1st paragraph), defence rights (in the 2nd paragraph), the right to 
be represented in litigation (in the 2nd part of  the 2nd paragraph) and the right to 
legal aid (3rd paragraph). Nowadays, fundamental rights’ protection and observance 
assume a “central place” “which was reasserted through the entry into force of  the Lisbon’s Treaty, 
which brought, with article 6 of  the TEU, the recognition of  legal biding force to the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the European Union”.10 It started to appear as “the proper catalogue 
of  fundamental rights […] biding to all organs and to the EU Institutions, as for the MS, when 
they apply Union law”.11 
In fact, this is the way forward since, as we already stated before, “[o]nly something 
like this would be possible to mature a system of  fundamental rights’ protection and it would allow 
judicial operators to be able to grasp, in a effective way, its functioning in the European juridical 
system, being able to overcome difficulties derived from this new regime that does not relate to appeals 
to an international instance […] but that installs itself, primarily, in litigation posed before national 
instances”.12   
Having said this, effective judicial protection is the setting where our own scope 
rests since it clarifies the intrinsic and external manifestations where the involvement 
capacity has been widened to promote a better functioning of  the mechanisms we 
are going to approach today.  
Since effective judicial protection is the beginning and the ending of  our 
8 See, among other, CJEU’s judgment Unibet, recital 43. 
9 See Anthony Arnull, “The principle of…”, 51. 
10 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições no contexto da adesão da União 
Europeia à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem: para onde caminha a tutela jurisdicional 
efetiva? – um exemplo no contexto do apoio judiciário”, in IX Encontro de Professores de Direito Público 
(e-book), ed.. Ana Gouveia Martins, Anabela Leão, Benedita Mac Crorie, Patrícia Fragoso Martins, 
(Universidade Católica Editora, 2017), 132 (free translation). 
11 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, Mariana Canotilho, “Comentário ao artigo 6.º do TUE”, in 
Tratado de Lisboa – Anotado e Comentado, ed. Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Almedina, 
2012), 40 (free translation). 
12 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”, 143 (free translation) 
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dogmatic digression, we must set the tone of  our first premise: it is important to 
adopt a better, modernised and improved sense of  EU Procedure. In fact, this is the 
operational concept that must be engaged when we talk about procedural solutions 
to demand rights, i.e., when we talk about effective judicial protection. 
And it is important to adopt European terminology and adapt it to new realities: 
since EU Procedure can embrace all procedural realities, as we will be able to see. 
1.1. Widening the concept of EU Procedure: reflections 
Dogmatically, this concept can be understood in two major senses: 
- Concerning its functional or organic approach;
- Concerning its material approach. 
The first one originally related and described the setting of  the organic European 
courts It described how the CJEU worked, how it was composed (nowadays, by 
the Court of  Justice, the General Court and the Specialized Courts), its structure, 
functioning and organisation. Nonetheless, there were authors13/14 that could 
innovate and this widened the functional notion of  EU Procedure. In fact, those 
authors remembered that EU law is mainly applied by national courts which, by 
doing so, are acting as European functioning courts15 or as courts of  “common law of  
the European Union”.16
In this concept’s enlarged understanding, EU Procedure aims to understand 
and to study the procedural impulses that are given both by European organic courts 
and national courts, when applying EU law. This, in fact, opened the opportunity to 
study the articulations between national and European courts through the preliminary 
ruling, when doubts concerning the validity of  EU acts and/or a difficulty with the 
interpretation of  EU law arises, allowing national courts to establish a profound 
dialogue with the CJEU. 
In this scenario, we have paid special attention to the dichotomy “Formal 
Dialogue/Informal Dialogue” that can be maintained between national courts and 
the CJEU, which we will be able to address later. 
We also should understand the material approach of  EU Procedure. In fact, most 
authors have not devoted enough attention to this dimension that is still presented 
in a strict sense, as the setting of  procedural rules that establish how procedures/
litigation will be developed before European organic courts. Bearing this definition 
in mind, only the rules of  procedure dealt with in the Treaties, in the Rules of  
Procedure and the Statute of  the European organic courts would be operant to that 
notion. However, this approach would only lead us to an outdated setting, especially 
if  bearing in mind, the enlarged concept adopted under the organic concept of  EU 
Procedure we already stressed. 
In this concept, we believe two major innovations should be made: 
- It also has to endorse procedural rules contemplated on European secondary 
13 See, on the matter and for greater development, Fausto de Quadros and Ana Maria Guerra 
Martins, Contencioso da União Europeia (2.ª edição – revista e actualizada, reimpressão, Almedina, 
2009). 
14 See, on the matter and for greater development, Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito.
15 See, on the matter and for greater development, Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito. 
16 See, on the matter and for greater development, Nuno Piçarra, “As incidências do direito da União 
Europeia sobre a organização e o exercício da função jurisdicional dos Estados-Membros”, Revista da Faculdade 
de Direito da Universidade do Porto, VII especial (2010), 212 (free translation).  
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law, namely Regulations that must be met and applied by national courts;
- It has also to endorse national procedural rules when national courts face 
EU litigation, even though the national rule is, in fact, European law at its fount 
(because it derives from transposition or EU law concretisation measures) or not (it 
is only national law applicable by the observance of  the principle of  the procedural 
autonomy).  
Therefore, if  today it is consensual that, organically, also national courts can be 
subsumed to the notion of  EU Procedure, we also have to modernise the material 
approach in order to cover all procedural rules that can be activated when EU law 
is applicable to the case – it will include procedural rules derived from primary EU 
law, but also secondary EU law (namely Regulations) and national rules when they 
are applicable to the litigation in the scope of  application of  EU law, despite the fact 
that those derive from a transposition or a EU law national concretisation or they are 
national rules called to the equation by the principle of  procedural autonomy. 
Taking into consideration the need to define EU Procedure, we are going to 
bear in mind two major European procedural mechanisms to understand if  there 
is a method/a means of  constitutional review in the EU context: the infringement 
procedure and the preliminary ruling process and, for that matter, if  we should 
understand the need of  the fundamental rights procedural mechanism existence.   
2. Procedural instruments under EU law as potential 
constitutional control mechanisms 
Dogmatically, there are two mechanisms that can act in that sense: the 
infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling. The first one is more intuitive 
since it can be related to an abstract constitutional review made by a specialised 
court – the Court of  Justice. The second one, the preliminary ruling, in its validity 
approach, can operate as a suis generis incidental, concrete and diffuse constitutional 
control secured by the same specialised court (also the Court of  Justice). 
2.1. The infringement procedure
The infringement procedure is set under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU. It does not 
contemplate the possibility of  private parties to resort to the CJEU since they lack 
active legitimacy. 
As we already stressed, the EU appears as a Union based on the rule of  law 
“since its Treaties act as its material Constitution”17 – they created a “juridical legal order, 
integrated in the juridical systems of  Member States and imposed itself  [the legal order] to their 
jurisdictional organs”.18 
As a Union based on the rule of  law, the EU needs to react to all EU law 
infringements in which Member States are engaging – and it does not do this by 
assessing which national entity is responsible for the infringement. Therefore, when 
17 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework relating to the making available on the 
market of  radio equipment (Directive 2014/53/UE): national legislator and ANACOM’s role – 
inadequate pursue of  the accused? Perspectives under EU procedure”, in, IX Annual Competition 
Spanish Seminar, (The Basque Competition Authority forthcoming), 18 (provisional reference). 
18 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual da União Europeia – Contencioso Comunitário, (2.ª Edição revista e aumentada, Fundação 
Calouste Gulbenkian, 2014), 515 (free translation). 
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Member States are in breach of  EU law, they are setting all necessary elements so an 
“original, important and severe”19 procedure can commence. In this procedure, “ECJ’s 
competence is exclusive and mandatory – Member States are bound to its jurisdiction just because 
they are Member States”20 and, in the non-litigation phase, Commission usually makes 
informal approaches to breaching Member States, which give the litigation “a different 
tone”.21 It is also a quite important procedure since it is “the effective means to guarantee 
Treaties’ respect and to secure Member States’ equality treatment principle to avoid transgressions 
to common rules and to secure […] law application uniformity […]”.22
For this reason, we can understand why the infringement procedure can act, 
in the EU, as a constitutional control mechanism in order to “refrain breaches of  EU 
Treaties”23 since they are the EU’s “basic constitutional charter”24/25. 
Therefore, the CJEU appears, in the infringement procedure, as “EU law’s 
assurer” as this procedural mechanism has, “as last addressee, the national legislator”26.  
In addition to those characteristics, this procedure has a strong impact on 
Member States juridical orders – in fact, “it means subdue a Member State to a public 
procedure where it is exposed for its infringement amongst its peers and before public opinion”.27
It has two major legitimate parties that can initiate the proceedings: the 
European Commission (under Article 258 of  the TFEU) and another Member State 
(under article 259 of  the TFEU). 
However, it can be seen as the underdog by the doctrine, especially since it does 
not recognize individuals’ legitimacy. 
As stated in the beginning, effective judicial protection establishes the context 
and the setting of  this dogmatic approach. Therefore, it is already clear that the 
infringement procedure acts as an abstract and concentrated constitutional control 
mechanism. Its functioning has been improving – on what effective judicial 
protection is related – especially, with the increasing importance given to private 
parties’ complaints presented to the Commission. 
In fact, a private party (an individual or a legal person) can present a complaint 
to the European Commission about actions/omissions of  a Member State’s public 
entities that can determine a breach of  the EU legal order. 
There are some formal requirements that a complaint must meet, to be 
accepted; it has to be written, stating, as accurately as possible, the infringement 
and determining the losses already felt by the complainant. “It must also state why 
19 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual…, 517 (free translation). 
20 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework” (forthcoming), 19 (provisional reference). 
21 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework” (forthcoming), 19 (provisional reference). 
22 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual, 518 (free translation). 
23 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework” (forthcoming), 19 (provisional reference). 
24 See, among others, CJEU’s judgement Commission v. EIB, 10 July 2003, case C-15/00, recital 75. 
25 For that matter, accordingly to article 6(1) of  the TEU, also the CFREU sets the “tone” to 
understand infringements in this matter. For further reading concerning the scope and the 
importance of  article 6 of  the TEU, see José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho and Mariana Canotilho, 
“Comentário ao artigo 6.º”. 
26 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Infringement procedure and the Court of  Justice as an EU law’s 
assurer: Member States’ infringements concerning failure to transpose directives and the principle 
of  an effective judicial protection”, in Towards a Universal Justice? Putting international courts and 
jurisdictions into perspective, Ed. Dário Moura Vicente (Brill, Nijhoff, Leiden: Boston, 2014), 469. 
27 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework” (forthcoming), 19 (provisional reference). 
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Commission’s intervention is important to resettle EU legality”.28 However, no juridical 
reasoning is mandatory.29 It is submitted online, using an electronic form (available 
in all EU official languages). The Commission will give notice to the complainant 
of  the receipt of  the complaint “within 15 working days and it will have a time frame of  
12 months to analyse the complaint and to decide whether to initiate an infringement procedure or 
not”. Despite this, the Commission continues to maintain its discretionary power on 
how to initiate the infringement procedure and whether or not it will present the case 
to the CJEU.30 This discretionary power also prevents individuals from demanding, 
from the Commission, the adoption of  any procedural position.31
Taking into consideration effective judicial protection constraints, the 
Commission made this complaint instrument a powerful tool so that private parties 
are able to report Member States’ infringements – which steamed from the update 
made on the Commissions’ Communication on how to handle complaints.32
As determined in this Communication, those complaints are “free of  charge”33 
and, despite some exceptions,34 they will be recorded in a central application. So that 
the private party can be aware of  the complaint’s reception, a registration number 
will be given to it and all further communications with the European Commission 
must mention that number.35 
The most important feature it that “[a]ll further developments will be noticed, in writing, 
to the complainant – from the formal notice to the referral to the ECJ or the closure of  the case”.36
Complainants’ data will be secured since the Commission is bound to fulfil 
European data protection standards.37 
Despite these precisions concerning securing claimants’ rights to understand 
how their complaints are being dealt, there are still voices raised concerning the need 
to open up the possibility of  private parties being able to have active legitimacy.38
In this sense, I have already recognised the need to settle an avenue individuals 
can use in order to directly address the Court. It is our belief  that the next step may 
be that (or a similar) development. Despite the fact there is an increased importance 
given to the complaint presented by individuals, that can act as a means of  improving 
fundamental rights’ protection and, therefore, be able to determine truly that the 
infringement procedure can act as a constitutional control.
28 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework” (forthcoming), 22 (provisional reference). 
29 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual…, 562. 
30 See, for further developments concerning Commission’s discretionary power, CJEU’s judgements 
Commission v. Greece, 6 December 1989, case C-329/88; Commission v. Greece, 27 November 1990, case 
C-200/88; Commission v. Germany, 1 June 1994, case C-317/92; Commission v. Belgium, 21 January 1999, 
case C-207/97; Commission v. Ireland, 25 November 1999, case C-212/98; Commission v. Federal Republic 
of  Germany, 14 May 2002, case C-383/00; Commission v. Spain, 6 October 2009, case C-562/07. 
31 See, for further development, CJEU’s judgement Lefebvre and others v. Commission, 14 September 
1995, case T-571/93. 
32 See European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, updating the 
handling of  relations with the complainant in respect of  the application of  Union law, Brussels, 2 April 2012, 
COM(2012) 154 final.  
33 See European Commission, Communication, 4. 
34 For instance, if  the complaint was made anonymously; it does not show which Member State is in 
breach; it does not deal with EU law, among others. 
35 See European Commission, Communication, 5. 
36 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “New European Framework” (forthcoming), 24 (provisional reference). 
37 See European Commission, Communication, 6. 
38 See, for further developments, Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Infringement procedure”. 
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2.2. Preliminary ruling: validity issues
On the other hand, we also find the preliminary ruling process. It is enshrined 
under Article 267 of  the TFEU which is “available to national courts, as European 
functioning courts, so they can ask the competent jurisdictional organ to that matter (i.e. the CJEU, 
the interpretation/validity’s verification of  EU law with relevance to the sub judice circumstance”.39 
As ascertained by the CJEU, “[t]he reference for a preliminary ruling is a fundamental 
mechanism of  European Union law aimed at enabling the courts and tribunals of  the Member 
States to ensure uniform interpretation and application of  that law within the European Union”.40 
However, as some European authors stress, this is a very innovative mechanism, 
since it does not presuppose any hierarchical relationship between national courts 
and the CJEU.41 
In the wise words of  Christiaan Timmermans, the preliminary ruling can be 
perceived as a “formal dialogue”42 between national courts and the CJEU since it 
delivers a jurisdictional cooperation43 between courts.44
As we will see, the most relevant type of  preliminary ruling to this discussion 
is the validity one. For that matter, we need to settle the notion of  validity: in this 
particular theme, the Advocate General Karl Roemer was able, in its Conclusions,45 
to lead the Court of  Justice to say the validity notion has to be understood in a 
widened sense,46 in order to allow questions concerning material legality (“intrinsic, 
resulting from the observance of  deep conditions”),47 but also formal legality (“which relates to 
the satisfaction of  formal requirements”)48 of  European acts. 
This ‘validity’ concept wide interpretation allows “large practical consequences on what 
concerns individuals’ protection, since it considerably reinforces the legality system of  jurisdictional 
safeguard in the Union’s scope”.49 In fact, this approach is also a concrete observance of  
that subjective dimension that, more recently, underlies the preliminary ruling. 
As presented by Alessandra Silveira, the preliminary ruling is “an effective judicial 
protection’s service – i.e., doctrine has been highlighting the subjective dimension of   the preliminary 
39 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Anotação ao Despacho do Tribunal de Justiça (10.ª Secção) de 16 
de julho de 2015 – Processo n.º C-507/14”, in Anuário de Direito Internacional 2014/2015 (Instituto 
Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa, 2016), 415 (free translation). 
40 See Court of  Justice of  the European Union, Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation 
to the initiation of  preliminary ruling proceedings, (2012/C 338/01), 6 November 2012, 1, recital 1. 
41 See, for further development, Alan Dashwood, Michael Dougan, Barry Rodger, Eleanor Spaventa 
and Derrick Wyatt, European Union Law (6th Edition, Hart Publishing, 2011), 209 to 210 and 216. 
42 See Christiaan Timmermans, “Multilevel judicial co-operation”, in Constitutionalising the EU judicial 
system: Essays in honour of  Pernilla Lindh, Eds. Pascal Cardonnel, Allan Rosa and Nils Wahl (Hart 
Publishing, 2012), 16.  
43 The word “cooperation” also appears in the contribution written by Maria Eugénia Martins de 
Nazaré Rodrigues, concerning the preliminary ruling. See, on the matter, Maria Eugénia Martins de 
Nazaré Rodrigues, “Anotação ao artigo 267.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa Anotado e Comentado, 
(Coords.) Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Almedina, 2012), 963. 
44 See, for further development, Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Anotação ao Despacho”, 416. 
45 See Advocate General Conclusions, 16 December 1963, joint cases C-73/63 and C-74/63. 
46 See CJEU’s judgement Internationale Crediet, 18 February 1964, joint cases C-73/63 and C-74/63. 
47 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual, 379 (free translation). 
48 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual, 379 (free translation).  
49 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual, 379 (free translation).  
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ruling, that one which is important to the defence of  individuals’ rights”.50
When preliminary references have been made to pose questions concerning 
invalidity of  a European disposition (of  derived law), we can foresee that the validity 
is going to be assessed under the standard given by the Treaties and the CFREU, so 
it can also be devised as a constitutional control. For that matter, when it comes to 
asking the CJEU about a European act’s validity because of  its potential damage to 
fundamental rights, enshrined in the CFREU, it will also serve as a judicial cooperation 
function in fundamental rights’ protection in the EU. 
Furthermore, this subjective dimension seems to be deepened by the decision 
Foto-Frost.51 Actually, from the literal sense derived from Article 267 of  the TFEU 
(and its predecessors), it seemed that, even when validity issues would be raised in 
the preliminary reference, it would only be mandatory courts to refer to the CJEU if  
they were deciding at last instance. Conversely, the decision Foto-Frost changed that 
understanding; the CJEU stated that the observance of  just an unlimited ability to 
refer, when validity questions were raised, could compromise the uniformity of  EU 
law, as derived from Recitals 14 and 15 of  the decision.52 
However, there are voices that do not accept this reasoning, understanding the 
CJEU went too far since the Article concerning preliminary references did not mean 
this. They understand “CJ adopted […] a solution that implied a praetorian creation of  law – 
innovating, one more time, against the rules enshrined in the Treaties”.53 
That notwithstanding, a national judge, facing a matter of  validity appreciation, 
has the ability not to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU “if  he considers that 
he must see as valid the questioned act”.54 However, there will be always an obligation to 
present a preliminary reference if  he is able to devise that the litigation solution can 
“imply an invalidity declaration”.55
This approach has been advanced, by the Court, in its IATA decision, when this 
Court clearly stated that “[i]t is settled case-law that national courts do not have the power to 
declare acts of  the Community institutions invalid. The main purpose of  the jurisdiction conferred 
on the Court by Article [267 FEU] is to ensure that Community law is applied uniformly 
by national courts. That requirement of  uniformity is particularly vital where the validity of  a 
Community act is in question. Differences between courts of  the Member States as to the validity 
of  Community acts would be liable to jeopardise the very unity of  the Community legal order and 
50 See Alessandra Silveira, Princípios de Direito, 233 and 234 (free translation). 
51 See CJEU’s judgement Foto-Frost, 22 October 1987, case C-314/85. 
52 See CJEU’s judgement Foto-Frost, recitals 14 and 15: “14. Those courts may consider the validity of  a 
Community act and, if  they consider that the grounds put forward before them by the parties in support of  invalidity 
are unfounded, they may reject them, concluding that the measure is completely valid. By taking that action they are 
not calling into question the existence of  the Community measure”; “15. On the other hand, those courts do not have 
the power to declare acts of  the Community institutions invalid. […] [T]he main purpose of  the powers accorded 
to the Court by Article [267] is to ensure that Community law is applied uniformly by national courts. That 
requirement of  uniformity is particularly imperative when the validity of  a Community act is in question. Divergences 
between courts in the Member States as to the validity of  Community acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the very 
unity of  the Community legal order and detract from the fundamental requirement of  legal certainty”. 
53 See João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota de Campos, O direito 
processual, 423, footnote 905 (free translation). 
54 See, for further development, João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota 
de Campos, O direito processual, 424 (free translation). 
55 See, for further development, João Mota de Campos, António Pinto Pereira and João Luiz Mota 
de Campos, O direito processual, 424 (free translation). 
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undermine the fundamental requirement of  legal certainty”.56
At last, invalidity causes that can trigger a preliminary ruling under Article 267 
of  the TFEU are only those that can undermine an act of  EU Institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and they are the same as those evoked under the action of  
annulment (Article 263 of  the TFEU).  
Despite methodological criticisms that can be levelled against Foto-Frost decision, 
the reality is that one allow us, in an even more proper sense, to understand that the 
preliminary ruling can act as a constitutional control, especially because, in the name 
of  EU law’s uniform application, validity questions have always to be referred to the 
CJEU.
3. Concretisations under inter-jurisdictionality theory
Inter-jurisdictionality stands for different and complementary jurisdictional 
systems living together in the same constitutional and legal space and it aims to 
understand how their reflexive interactions can be maintained to fully promote the 
principle of  effective judicial protection.57 
This unique concept has profound effects on the “organizational scheme of  access to 
justice consecrated in the constitutional texts […] and in the States’ internal legislation”.58 In the 
EU context, inter-jurisdictionality will allow that “the applicability of  material law of  a 
normative level is secured within that same level”,59 which means that, when litigation derives 
from the scope of  application of  EU law, the courts will have to solve it using the 
means set in that same legal space – the EU space (even if  the procedural solutions 
derive from national legislation, they are being used based on the general principle of  
Member States’ procedural autonomy, which is developed under EU law).
Furthermore, fundamental rights’ protection (or the inter jusfundamentality60 
approach, as perceived by Gomes Canotilho) is a concern that cannot be also forgotten 
when we are dealing with an inter-jurisdictional setting. In fact, “accumulation and 
overlapping of  fundamental rights, recognised and guaranteed in several levels, demand an adequate 
organization, especially when the protection obeys different standards and allows the comparison 
of  different protection stages achieved by accumulated and overlapped rights in the several levels of  
protection”.61
This acquires particular importance in the EU context, where fundamental 
rights’ protection achieved a new standard of  protection. As enshrined under Article 
53 of  the CFREU, the EU is going to promote the highest standard of  fundamental 
rights’ protection, when EU law is called upon to solve the litigation. Therefore, 
the accumulation and overlapping we were discussing, in the EU context, derives 
from the fact that fundamental rights’ protection was developed by taking into 
consideration the standard derived from Member States’ constitutional traditions 
and international derivations of  human rights’ protection, especially the protection 
56 See CJEU’s judgement IATA, 10 January 2006, case C-344/04, recital 27. 
57 This definition was inspired on José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho’s concept of  “interconstitutionality” 
and the theory this author developed around it. 
58 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito e internormatividade”, in Direito da União 
Europeia e transnacionalidade, ed. Alessandra Silveira (Ação Jean Monnet - Information and Research 
Activities, Quid Juris, 2010), 177 (free translation). 
59 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 177 (free translation). 
60 See, for further development, José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”. 
61 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 181 (free translation). 
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promoted under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This left “the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional fundamental rights protected under 
Member States’ Constitutions stay[ed] undisturbed”.62
Taking those developments into consideration, effective judicial protection and 
the inter-jurisdictional approach (that emanates from it) are in close connection with 
those worries concerning fundamental rights’ protection in the EU. When we try 
to perceive constitutional control mechanisms in this same legal space, we are also 
trying to unravel efficient judicial mechanisms that are able to secure and ensure 
fundamental rights in this legal order and, for that matter, the highest standard of  
protection that exists in the EU context, namely the CFREU. Here, we try to exercise, 
even if  timidly, the necessary exegesis to unravel the jurisdictional mechanisms 
the EU legal system has so that they are able to appear as constitutional review 
mechanisms (and act as those). Consequently, they will be able to secure fundamental 
rights’ protection without needing a new and proper judicial figure to do so because 
“[l]ooking for a parameter of  unitary control is particularly important in the European Union 
system”.63 
So, the organic concept of  EU Procedure becomes vital since both national 
courts and the CJEU are going to be mobilised in this inter-jurisdictional approach. 
National courts have a decisive role on the matter since “the competence [can be] of  
national courts but the law that determines the acts submitted to jurisdictional appreciation of  
Member States’ courts is EU law”.64 This understanding allows us to take the step 
forward. Since national courts are called upon, Member States’ procedural autonomy 
also comes into light, which also determines that national procedural rules have to 
be contemplated in the wider material notion of  EU Procedure.
One of  those instruments of  unitary control is the preliminary ruling but, it also 
aims to consider those judicial control means “composed by procedural […] impositions 
that conduct the discretionary range’s reduction of  national authorities”.65 In this sense, the 
infringement procedure fits in this profile because it can be seen as the ultimate 
judicial mechanism to limit and even control national discretionary powers, especially 
when it comes to Directives’ lack of  transposition.  
In fact, the preliminary ruling, especially the validity type, can be at the service 
of  fundamental rights’ protection and become a sui generis constitutional control in 
which the CJEU by considering invalid a European legal rule, it is going to be doing 
that taking as legality referral the constitutive Treaties and the CFREU [article 6(1) 
of  the TEU]. On the other hand, the infringement procedure can be seen as a more 
intuitive constitutional control instrument of  both actions and omissions of  Member 
States, taking as reference, the terms emanating from the Treaties and the CFREU. 
But our reflection also has some support on empirical sensibilities, namely 
based on the recently published CJEU’s 2016 Annual Report. 
In 2016, 453 preliminary rulings and 34 infringement procedures were brought 
before that Court. 31 concerning failure to fulfil obligations and three concerning 
twofold failure to fulfil obligations.66 Particularly concerning infringement procedure, 
62 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 181 (free translation). 
63 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 183 (free translation). 
64 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 183 (free translation). 
65 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 183 and 184 (free translation). 
66 See Court of  Justice of  the European Union, 2016 Annual Report – “The year in review”, 27, 
available, in English, in the website: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2017-04/ragp-2016_final_en_web.pdf  (access: May 15th 2017). 
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the CJEU declared the infringement of  16 Member States in 27 different procedures 
and decided twofold failure to fulfil obligations in two situations.67 
Furthermore, the Court is the competent one to deal with these procedures, 
where the proceedings’ duration is around 14.7 months long.68 
In this particular context, Christiaan Timmermans also called our attention to 
an “informal dialogue”69 between the CJEU and national courts. This dialogue aims to 
increase effective judicial protection: 
- Two times a year, the Court promotes an informal meeting with Member 
States’ judges to inform them on its functioning and to hear about their doubts and 
worries;
- The Court of  Justice also receives Member States’ superior courts delegations 
and reunions happen following a round-table system;70
- The Court also visits national supreme and constitutional courts;
- It is usual to the CJEU to engage in interactions with judges and public 
prosecutors’ associations.71 
This judicial proximity (which promotes sociological integration) comes 
from the courts’ will to collaborate. This knowledge demands improving judicial 
relations between the CJEU and national courts so that the latter feel engaged in the 
prosecution of  fundamental rights recognised under the EU legal order. 
In the same informal approach, we must bear in mind improvements made on 
complaints presented by individuals before the European Commission concerning 
grounds for infringement procedures. As we had the opportunity to mention, 
complaints are one of  the most effective means to improve, in an indirect way, the 
engagement of  individuals and has recently received a more transparent treatment 
by the Commission. 
4. Practical derivations concerning fundamental rights’ 
protection: effective judicial protection under the microscope 
– legal aid dimension and Portuguese reality
Effective judicial protection saw its dimensions being stipulated as fundamental 
rights, in the CFREU, and one of  those is the right to have legal aid in circumstances 
of  financial insufficiency. 
Concerning legal aid, the EU has adopted Directive 2003/8/CE to improve 
access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules 
relating to legal aid for such disputes. 
Portugal adopted national legislation, Lei 34/2004,72 to partially transpose 
that Directive, which gives Member States the possibility to predict less restrictive 
conditions since the European act only established minimum rules.
It was thought to promote better access to justice, mainly to those who “lack 
67 See Court of  Justice of  the European Union, 2016 Annual Report, 28. 
68 See Court of  Justice of  the European Union, 2016 Annual Report, 28.  
69 See Christiaan Timmermans, “Multilevel judicial co-operation”, 17. 
70 See, for further reading, Court of  Justice of  the European Union, 2016 Annual Report, 34 and 35. 
71 See Christiaan Timmermans, “Multilevel judicial co-operation”, 17 to 19. 
72 Lei 34/2004, of  July 29th, revised under Lei 47/2007, of  August 28th, available, in Portuguese, in 
the website http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=80&tabela=leis&ficha=1
&pagina=1&so_miolo=& (access: May 15th 2017). 
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sufficient resources”73 – being able to fully understand and follow the goals set under 
effective judicial protection as consecrated in Article 47 of  the CFREU74 since “[n]
either the lack of  resources of  a litigant, whether acting as claimant or as defendant, nor the 
difficulties flowing from a dispute’s cross-border dimension should be allowed to hamper effective 
access to justice”.75 Bearing this in mind, the Directive’s direct goal “lies in the providing 
access to justice to those without the financial means necessary, in order to guarantee that no person 
is legally defenceless because they lack the financial resources to litigate”.76
This came into light because, before the Directive’s adoption, all Member States 
regulated legal aid in different ways and with various approaches, where “concession 
conditions were disparate and its extent also ended up varying”.77
Taking into consideration the Green Paper from the Commission concerning 
legal aid, some risks were studied about effective judicial protection. Those emerged 
in the absence of  economic resources. This Green Paper even stated that “[a] 
comparative study of  the national schemes on legal aid shows that in fact these systems differ 
considerably, thereby presenting a cross-border litigant with serious difficulties”.78 
The Directive allows “a growing harmonization between Member States’ legislation, 
obliged to its transposition, in strict respect for the principle of  their procedural autonomy”.79
In this sense, the Directive does not define legal person but it only refers to 
persons. In fact, it derives “from its literal sense that [legal persons] do not have this kind of  
aid”.80 The Directive is binding and requires Member States to observe its minimum 
rules – forbidding them from adopting more restrictive ones – but leaves them the 
necessary freedom to create a more favourable regime in their internal legal order. 
Taking into consideration this ability, some of  them – such as Portugal – recognised 
the possibility of  some legal persons to have the right to legal aid, as we can derive 
from Article 7(3) of  the national legislation (Lei 34/2004).
Despite this, we already had the chance to comment on some national 
jurisprudence that wrongfully interpreted EU law applicable to the litigation81 – not 
only the Directive’s scope of  application, but, more incisively, the interpretation 
of  Article 47 of  CFREU, forgetting the settled case law of  the CJEU, namely the 
DEB Deutsche decision.82 New developments concerning national jurisprudence were 
faced, especially in a Portuguese Constitutional Court’s decision and it is important 
to analyse this particular jurisprudence in order to understand, in a practical way, how 
73 See Directive 2003/8/CE, recital 5 
74 See Directive 2003/8/CE, recital 5. 
75 See Directive 2003/8/CE, recital 6. 
76 See Virginia Pardo Iranzo and Rosa Pascual Serrats, “Minimum common regulations on legal aid: 
Directive 2003/8”, in European Civil Procedure, ed. Maria Pía Calderon Cuadrado, Fernando Gascon 
Inchausti, Carmen Senés Motilla and Jaime Vegas Torres (European Commission, Aranzadi, Swett 
& Maxwell, 2011), 265. 
77 See Joana Rita de Sousa Covelo de Abreu, Tribunais nacionais e tutela jurisdicional efetiva: da cooperação à 
integração judiciária no Contencioso da União Europeia, (PhD thesis, University of  Minho, 2014), 279 (free 
translation). 
78 See European Commission, Green Paper “Legal aid in civil matters: the problems confronting the cross-border 
litigant”, February 9th 2000, COM(2000) 51 final, available, in English, in the website http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0051&qid=1494929615360&fro
m=PT (access: May 16th 2017) 
79 See Joana Rita de Sousa Covelo de Abreu, Tribunais nacionais, 279 (free translation). 
80 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”, 136 (free translation). 
81 See, for further development, Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”. 
82 See CJEU’s judgement DEB Deutsche, 22 December 2010, case C-279/09. 
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fundamental rights’ protection has been observed under Portuguese national reality 
so that we able to settle which steps forward must be set in motion and derived 
dogmatically so that fundamental rights can be truly observed in a integrated judicial 
space as it is the EU.  
4.1. Analysing the Portuguese Constitutional Court decision: namely, 
decision 591/2016 
In this particular approach, the wording of  Gomes Canotilho is particularly 
enlightening: “[i]n terms of  interjurisdictionality, it is interesting to verify if  the articulation of  
several levels of  access to courts can or not be translated in restrictions to opening the judicial via”.83 
As we will perceive, there is a matter concerning the understanding of  effective 
judicial protection and it is important to unravel how the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court approached the matter, especially when it comes to one of  the most effective 
judicial protection dimensions – legal aid. 
On November 9th, 2016, the Portuguese Constitutional Court issued decision nr. 
591/2016, concerning an incidental and concrete constitutionality control presented 
before this court. 
In the litigation, a legal person presented, before the competent national 
administrative authority (Instituto da Segurança Social, I.P. – Centro Distrital de 
Braga), a request for legal aid, which was refused without further consideration since 
Article 7(3) of  the Lei 34/2004 is clear when it states that “legal persons operating for 
profit and individual establishments of  limited liability do not have the right to legal aid”.84
Not accepting that decision, the legal person presented an action before the 
national first instance court where they pleaded for Article 7(3) of  the Lei 34/2004 
to be deemed unconstitutional and, simultaneously, in contravention of  Article 47 
of  the CFREU. 
The court decided against the legal person because of  the “clear impracticability” of  
the litigation, holding, inter alia, that the national legislation was not unconstitutional 
since Article 20 of  the Portuguese Constitution demands concretisation matters 
and, for that matter, the limitation emanating from the national legislation was not 
compromising the Constitution’s setting since other legal mechanisms could be used 
by the litigator, such as financial stress. 
However, the national court did not mention anything concerning EU law and 
the interpretation national legal rules should meet under EU general principles. 
The litigator did not rest with that decision and presented a constitutionality 
appeal to the Portuguese Constitutional Court, which gave light to the decision we 
are now addressing, considering the national rule as contrary to Article 20 of  the 
Portuguese Constitution when it states that legal persons operating for profit are not 
able to have legal aid, without minding their particular economic situation or their 
financial specificities.85 
Concerning its appeal reasoning, the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
understood Article 7(3) of  the Lei 34/2004 was unconstitutional because “the access 
83 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de direito”, 178 (free translation). 
84 See article 7(3) of  the Lei 34/2004, which states, in portuguese, “As pessoas coletivas com fins lucrativos 
e os estabelecimentos individuais de responsabilidade limitada não têm direito a proteção jurídica”. 
85 See Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment 591/2016, 9 November 2016, case 278/16, 2, 
available in the website http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/acordaos/20160591.html (access: 
May 16th 2017). 
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to courts […] is an indispensible guarantee of  fundamental rights protection and, as such, inherent 
to the idea of  the Rule of  Law: without prejudice of  its nature of  rendered dependent right and 
legally bind right, what is certain is that nobody – individual or legal person, national or not – can 
be deprived to lead his cause to appreciation before a court”.86  
Therefore, “[t]he content of  this right cannot be emptied or practically unused because of  
economic means’ insufficiency”.87  
Furthermore, accepting the complete and absolute exclusion of  legal persons 
operating for profit from the ratio and the teleology of  Article 7(3) of  the Lei 34/2004, 
it would take away from a whole category of  subjects (that also have the right to access 
to courts to exercise their rights) a right that is acknowledged both by the national 
Constitution but also by biding international regimes of  fundamental rights/human 
rights’ protection, to which Portugal is bound. In this sense, the Constitutional Court 
states that an evaluation about the legal person’s economic situation should be made 
in order to prevent there being an absolute and disproportionate lack of  legal aid to 
all legal persons operating for profit. 
We must bear in mind the final tale of  numbers 7 and 8 of  this decision in order 
to understand major conclusions we are going to extract. 
In this particular approach, the Constitutional Court summarized the majority 
position under the Constitutional Court by stating that, under this understanding 
“[…] legal aid to legal persons operating for profit comes as dysfunctional and potentially, a 
generator of  inequalities between competing companies in the same market and […] as a potential 
unbalancing factor for that market”.88 
Refusing that approach, the Portuguese Constitutional Court recalls the CJEU 
DEB Deutsche decision.
In this decision, the CJEU started to understand that, although Article 47(3rd 
paragraph) of  the CFREU seems to refer itself  only to individuals, it does not exclude 
legal persons, even if  taking its literal sense into consideration. In fact, “reflecting on 
the Chapter VI where article 47 is inserted, makes sense, systematically, to include legal persons”:89 
in fact, in that Chapter VI we can find “other procedural principles […] which apply to both 
natural and legal persons”.90 Furthermore, since effective judicial protection was not 
included in the CFREU’s Chapter concerning “Solidarity”, it cannot be “[…] conceived 
primarily as social assistance” to understand it “[…] reserved to natural persons”.91 
Even more, to set aside any doubts, the CJEU continues, despite the fact that 
Directive 2003/8/CE does not contemplate legal aid to legal persons, that does not 
mean that we can derive from that a general conclusion since it derives, from the 
scope of  the Directive’s application, that it only establishes minimum rules, allowing 
Member States to create more favourable regimes. 
In this sense, the CJEU concluded that “the grant of  legal aid to legal persons is not 
in principle impossible, but must be assessed in the light of  the applicable rules and the situation 
of  the company concerned”92 – by doing so, the CJEU shows the company’s economic 
situation must be assessed, taking into consideration the criteria this court underlines 
in Recital 54: “the form of  the company […]; the financial capacity of  its shareholders; the objects 
86 See Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment 591/2016, 4, n.º. 4, 2nd paragraph. 
87 See Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment 591/2016, 4, n.º. 4, 2nd paragraph. 
88 See Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment 591/2016, 6, n.º. 7, 3nd paragraph. 
89 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”, 137 (free translation). 
90 See CJEU’s judgement DEB Deutsche, recital 40. 
91 See CJEU’s judgement DEB Deutsche, recital 41.  
92 See CJEU’s judgement DEB Deutsche, recital 52.  
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of  the company; the manner in which it has been set up; and, more specifically, the relationship 
between the resources allocated to it and the intended activity”. 
As stated before, “[w]ith this decision, the Court of  Justice does not close the door so 
legal persons can be granted, under Union law, with legal aid” – however, this conclusion 
emanates from the interconstitutionality phenomena:93 taking into consideration 
“ECHR’s settled jurisprudence, which helps to interpret the CFREU’s dispositions (influenced by 
common Member States’ traditions and by instruments of  human rights’ protection of  international 
character, where ECHR is highlighted), ECJ derived, systematic and literally, from the CFREU, 
that also legal persons will be able to enjoy legal aid in situations of  economic scarcity”.94 
All these developments were considered by the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
– in fact, this Court come to the conclusion that the understanding stressed by the 
CJEU of  this effective judicial protection dimension “sets aside the idea of  a necessary 
incompatibility between legal aid granted to legal persons operating for profit and the good functioning 
of  competing markets, as it is in the Internal Market”. And it goes on: “[…] legal aid does 
not necessarily constitute a competition distortion factor or of  favouring commercial companies; […] 
this cannot be considered equivalent or qualified as aid granted by the State or derived from public 
financial resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition”.95 
Still, the Portuguese Constitutional Court shows a systemic worry: “It is enough to 
think in the hypothesis of  a commercial company, Portuguese or national from another Member State 
of  the European Union, in economic difficulties due to the violation of  European Union law by the 
Portuguese State and that wants to enforce the civil liability of  the latter: an absolute impossibility 
of  discussing – it is that the sense of  the legal aid request’s rejection […] – with the competent 
Portuguese authorities its economic insufficiency […] is contrary to article 47, third paragraph 
of  the CFREU and puts it in a situation of  inequality towards other legal persons in parallel 
situation in other Member States”.96 In the same sense, it uses the previous syllogism to 
avoid a discrimination of  legal persons domiciled in Portugal and pleading here. 
Despite not saying so, the Constitutional Court derived that sense from the need to 
93 Concerning the concepts of  interconstitutionality or of  plural constitutionalism – both 
characterizing the European integration process after Lisbon, see, among others, José Joaquim 
Gomes Canotilho, “Brancosos” e Interconstitucionalidade. Itinerários dos discursos sobre a historicidade 
constitucional (Almedina, 2006); Paulo Castro Rangel, O estado do Estado. Ensaios de política constitucional 
sobre justiça e democracia (Dom Quixote, 2009); Miguel Poiares Maduro, A Constituição Plural. 
Constitucionalismo e União Europeia (Principia, 2006); Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Three Claims of  
Constitutional Pluralism”, in Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond, (eds.) Matej 
Avbelj and Jan Komárek (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012); Alessandra 
Silveira, “Intersubjectividade, interdemocraticidade, interconstitucionalidade, Filosofia Política e 
juridicidade europeia”, in Pensar radicalmente a humanidade, Ensaios em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor Acílio da 
Silva Estanqueiro Rocha, (Org.) João Cardoso Rosas and Vítor Moura (Edições Húmus, Universidade 
do Minho, Centro de Estudos Humanísticos, 2011); Di Federico Giacomo, “Fundamental rights 
in the EU: Legal pluralism and multi-level protection after the Lisbon Treaty”, in The EU Charter 
of  fundamental rights: from Declaration to Binding Instrument, (Ed.) Di Federico Giacomo (Ius Gentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 8, Springer, 2011); Alexander Egger, “EU-fundamental 
rights in the national legal order: the obligations of  the Member States revisited”, in Yearbook of  European 
Law, 25 (2006); Leonard Besselink, “Entrapped by the maximum standard: on fundamental rights, pluralism 
and subsidiarity in the European Union”, in Common Market Law Review, n.º 35 (1998); Joseph 
H. Weiler and Nicholas Lokhart, “Taking rights seriously: the European Court and its fundamental rights 
jurisprudence, Parts I and II”, in Common Market Law Review, n.º 32 (1995); Christiaan Timmermans, 
“Multilevel judicial”. 
94 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”, 139 (free translation). 
95 See Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment 591/2016, 8, n.º 8, 4th paragraph. 
96 See Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment 591/2016, 8, n.º 8, 5th paragraph. 
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avoid discrimination based on nationality, also a fundament derived from EU law. 
As we can foresee, the Portuguese Constitutional Court had an impressive 
approach on the matter, using EU law to reinforce its position, especially to undermine 
previous jurisprudence of  that same Court in the opposite sense. However, as we 
could derive, EU law was called upon in the discussion concerning the possibility of  
distorting competition in the Internal Market and, especially, appearing as state aid, 
in the sense of  Article 107 of  the TFEU. 
The litigation was quite similar to the one posed before the CJEU in the 
DEB Deutsche case. However, after using the settled jurisprudence, the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court derived new approaches and understood, in the underlying 
context of  that decision, something innovative concerning legal aid not being seen 
as a means to distort competition and, furthermore, not appearing as state aid.  Since 
it is a completely new approach, the Portuguese Constitutional Court should have 
presented a preliminary ruling to the CJEU in order to fully fulfil the integration 
purpose the preliminary ruling brings. 
By not doing so, the Portuguese Constitutional Court still does not really 
understand how and when it has to refer to the CJEU – and the case only posed an 
interpretative preliminary reference... Therefore, in an issue of  fundamental rights’ 
protection, a Constitutional Court was not able to refer – this means that there is still 
some unfamiliarity concerning how contemporary European judicial mechanisms 
work. Creating new schemes and procedural solutions would only import new 
problems to an old discussion. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU’s Annual Report shows Portuguese preliminary 
references are increasing – and we must enjoy this reality instead of  creating and 
setting a new mean of  disturbance.  
Furthermore, it is quite impressive seeing the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court approach EU law in such an innovative way – however, it would be greater 
if  a preliminary ruling was made concerning those potential distortions in the 
Internal Market and in free competition, so that all Member States could enjoy new 
developments in understanding effective judicial protection and, especially, legal aid, 
namely when it comes to legal persons operating for profit.
5. Final remarks
Effective judicial protection sets the tone, the context and the finalistic 
approach we are aiming to meet in these final remarks since it is the visible, palpable 
and operative face of  interjurisdictional phenomenon which explains the setting and 
functioning of  judicial mechanisms in the EU. 
Therefore, interjurisdictional phenomenon comes as the method to be adopted 
so we can extract conclusions that do not collide with the promotion of  efficient 
legal and judicial protection. 
This is quite important – if  not vital – in a legal order with its own judicial 
instruments to both interpret and to scrutinize the rules that the juridical order 
creates – which leads us to the idea of  the EU being a true Union of  Law. 
Taking this into consideration, this reflection is only possible if  we embrace a 
wider notion of  EU Procedure: not only from a functional/organic approach, where 
national courts are contemplated in its definition; but also in a material approach to 
mind derived EU law where procedural rules are established and national procedural 
solutions are used to deal with EU law litigation under the scope of  Member States’ 
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procedural autonomy. 
Bearing in mind EU is acting as a Union of  Law, where the Treaties (and 
the CFREU, as stressed by Article 6 of  the TEU) are its constitutional basis, we 
understand there are two main instruments that can act as constitutional control 
mechanisms:
- The infringement procedure; 
- The preliminary ruling, namely the validity type. 
The first one operates as an abstract and concentrated constitutional review 
since it aims to declare infringements committed by breaching Member States to 
fulfil obligations that emanate from the Treaties (as those obligations derived from 
national Constitutions that demand legislative concretisation). 
The second one can be perceived as a concrete and diffuse constitutional 
control, being operated on litigation emerging before “common courts”97 of  EU law 
– national courts. In fact, especially when it comes to the obligation of  referring 
cases to the CJEU which concern validity issues, we are able to understand that a 
constitutional analysis is demanded from the Court: national courts are referring this 
to the Court of  Justice so it can state if  a European act/disposition is in conformity 
with the European constitutional framework set by the Treaties or not. 
Another premise we had to bear in mind demands an empirical approach: 
are these judicial instruments working well? Are they being able to maintain, in the 
future, this constitutional feature? 
Well, when we address effective judicial protection and interjurisdictional 
setting in a constitutional approach, the most visible feature is to understand if, 
simultaneously, those “constitutional” mechanisms are able to provide and to ensure 
fundamental rights’ protection and if  they act as a potential instrument to improve 
that protection:
- Nowadays, infringement procedure can also incidentally act as fundamental 
rights’ instrument since it will assess Member States’ behaviour under the scope of  
the CFREU;
- Concerning preliminary ruling, fundamental rights’ protection is one of  
major addressed issues. 
On fundamental rights’ protection, we should call upon a recent decision of  
the Portuguese Constitutional Court where one of  the most mentioned fundamental 
rights’ dimension is brought into the equation: legal aid. The Portuguese Constitutional 
Court steps away from its dominant position on the matter, stating legal persons 
operating for profit can be granted legal aid and, to do so, it uses the CJEU’s reasoning 
in the DEB Deutsche decision. With this decision, national court adopt a way to 
activate the highest standard of  fundamental rights’ protection, emanating from EU 
law, since it comes to the conclusion that the CJEU’s interpretation of  Article 47 
(3rd paragraph) of  the CFREU provides a higher standard of  protection than the 
one this court, in its previous decisions, was able to derive from its Constitution’s 
interpretation. 
However, despite going so far, it did not make a reference to the CJEU: in 
fact, it solves an apparent fundamental rights’ conflict between legal aid and free 
competition and the entrepreneurial freedom by resorting the CJEU reasoning in the 
DEB Deutsche decision. Still, this Court’s decision did not address this issue and the 
fundamental rights’ conflict should have been solved in the EU legal order. As there 
97 See, on the matter and for greater development, Nuno Piçarra, As incidências…. 
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was no European settled jurisprudence on this issue, the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court had to refer in order to promote the preliminary ruling final tale: to promote 
uniform application and interpretation of  EU law in all of  its space. 
This shows how there is still a resistance to refer to the CJEU. So, introducing 
a new mechanism would only create further difficulties – in fact, when that Court’s 
Annual Report starts to unravel meaningful developments concerning both 
mechanisms, introducing a new scheme, which would only compromise further 
integration. 
Under the opportunity opened by the CJEU, in its 2016 Annual Report, 
concerning “Looking ahead: quality of  justice, an ongoing challenge”,98 we have the chance 
to devise some procedural solutions. 
As the Court states: “the quality of  justice constitutes an ongoing challenge for every 
judicial institution” and, therefore, it sets three main axes to reflect in the future: 1) 
“reforming judicial structure of  the European Union”; 2) “recasting the rules of  procedure”; and 
3) “modernising and reviewing working methods”.99 
Under this CJEU’s sensibility, we are concerned on presenting some procedural 
solutions to improve both fundamental rights’ protection and that can justify a 
densification of  constitutional control mechanisms. However, it is our aim that the 
structure and genesis of  the EU judicial system remain untouched for operative 
reasons. 
The EU cannot take a different path when it was so difficult for Member States’ 
courts to understand the judicial functioning in this widened range of  action. In 
fact, perceiving the CJEU as an appeal court would have this distorting effect we 
want to avoid. Furthermore, it would compromise that idea of  justice’s proximity, 
creating alarming elements in a setting that was hard to accommodate. Recently, 
Samo Bardutsky stated: “preliminary ruling can overcome some federal flaws...”100 that can be 
perceived in the EU.  
In this sense, it was our belief, already made public, the infringement procedure 
should be subjected to a revision, taking into consideration the right to action, one 
of  effective judicial protection’s dimensions, besides the ability private parties have 
to complain to the Commission – which was particularly developed in order to make 
it more transparent – especially when it comes to failures to fulfil caused by the lack 
of  Directives’ transposition, “it would be useful if  private parties could gain active legitimacy 
like the one it is recognised to Member States, in order to have the chance to promote an infringement 
procedure before the CJEU when the Commission does not deliver its reasoned opinion within three 
months of  the date on which the matter was brought before it”.101 
This solution could be quite innovative since “when national law is not in compliance 
with EU law – namely, when Directive’s transposition does not occur – first repercussions are felt 
by European citizens’ juridical sphere”.102 But some kind of  filtering should be thought of  
in order to prevent the CJEU from receiving an excessive number of  infringement 
98 See Court of  Justice of  the European Union, 2016 Annual Report – “The year in review”, 47. 
99 See Court of  Justice of  the European Union, 2016 Annual Report – “The year in review”, 47. 
100 This sensibility was developed under Samo Bardutsky’s intervention, as Distinguished speaker, 
in the International Conference More EU Conference – The federal experience of  the European Union: past, 
present and future, held at the Faculty of  Law of  the New University of  Lisbon, 22nd – 23rd May 2017, 
in the panel “European Union and federalism on the sixtieth anniversary of  the Treaty of  Rome” – 
9:00 a.m. 
101 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Infringement procedure”, 474 and 475. 
102 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Infringement procedure”, 473. 
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actions. 
It would also have an impact on how citizens perceive themselves as being part 
of  an integrated system as it is the EU: “it would promote a closer relationship between 
private parties and the European institutions and it would promote a better way to look after 
compliance with EU law”.103
To better achieve fundamental rights’ protection in a proximity matter, we can 
also vote our attention to a new approach on preliminary ruling references. In fact, 
when national courts and tribunals face litigation where fundamental rights were 
the main issue and it was submitted to EU law’s scope of  application, a particular 
proceeding to deal with these topics in a more expedient manner should be created. 
Furthermore, it would have mandatory character since the CJEU should be the 
privative instance to deal with these relevant topics, despite which national instance 
was faced with the fundamental rights’ problem.
So far, it is quite clear that the path cannot be to create an entirely new instrument 
but, perhaps, to rely on those that already work as such constitutional control and 
fundamental rights’ protection means; otherwise, functioning problems will emerge. 
And we already sensed this in another context: “so the European Union jurisdictional 
structure was not reconfigured, which was always seen as different, it would be important to create 
a fundamental rights’ mechanism which could run before the Court of  Justice but that would suffer 
some kind of  filtering to avoid this court would start to seem as an appeal instance and that can be 
cases’ ‘overwhelmed’”.104  
Already addressing this sensibility, if  a new fundamental rights’ protection 
mechanism would be thought, it would run with influences of  existing procedural 
mechanisms (namely the infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling),105 
despite the evolving awareness we have of  the conviction that the existing mechanisms 
are adequate and able to both act as constitutional control and fundamental rights’ 
protection.
This setting will be suited to better improve effective judicial protection in the 
EU – as our teleological goal – using the method of  inter-jurisdictionality and relying 
on a wide approach to the EU Procedure concept.  
Therefore, we believe we now face a real judicial integration which also emanates 
from the fact of  it now being possible to understand that the EU is already equipped 
with some constitutional control and fundamental rights’ protection mechanisms. 
As stressed recently by the Portuguese judge in the CJEU, Judge Cruz Vilaça, it is 
quite clear the EU has adopted the idea of  a “judicial federalization” to surpass a mere 
“judicial cooperation”106/107 – and we think when the Portuguese Judge understands 
it, he is going further than the expression he is using since there are already signs 
103 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “Infringement procedure”, 474.  
104 See Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”, 142 and 143 (free translation). 
105 See, for further developments, Joana Covelo de Abreu, “As interações entre jurisdições”, 143 (free 
translation). 
106 This sensibility was developed under José Luís da Cruz Vilaça’s intervention, as Distinguished 
speaker, in the International Conference More EU Conference – The federal experience of  the European 
Union: past, present and future, held at the Faculty of  Law of  the New University of  Lisbon, 22nd – 23rd 
May 2017, in the panel, in Portuguese, “A União Europeia como sistema federal sui generis: crise e 
desafios recentes”. 
107 For further development, Alessandra Silveira, July 4, 2017, Editorial of  June 2017 “Waiting for 
a federal big bang in EU? Updating the theory of  federalism in times of  liquid modernity”, UNIO 
– EU Law Journal – The official blog – Thinking and debating Europe, June 1, 2017, https://
officialblogofunio.com/2017/06/01/editorial-of-june-2017/. 
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that show we face a judicial integration, more relatable to the integration process 
EU is constantly experiencing. It is also this Judge’s opinion that the “scheme must be 
maintained: and what is already existing must be deepened”.108 In order to meet this goal, 
this Judge stated, inter alia, some scenarios that must be greatly emphasised so that 
judicial integration can fulfil its goals: the CJEU’s competences must be enlarged; the 
cross-border fertilisation between the CJEU and national courts must be densified; a 
quality interoperable justice must be settled; national supreme courts must intervene, 
under preliminary references, as amicus curiæ...109  
Therefore, our sensitivity was corroborated by this European organic Judge 
because we firmly believe the path must be by deepening judicial integration, which 
sets aside breaking with the past but, relying and improving jurisdictional instruments 
already existing in the EU. Only by doing so – it is our belief  –, will the EU will be 
able to overcome those difficulties with which it has been struggling for so long.   
108 This sensibility was developed under José Luís da Cruz Vilaça’s intervention, as Distinguished 
speaker, in the International Conference More EU Conference – The federal experience of  the European 
Union: past, present and future, held at the Faculty of  Law of  the New University of  Lisbon, 22nd – 23rd 
May 2017, in the panel, in Portuguese, “A União Europeia como sistema federal sui generis: crise e 
desafios recentes”. 
109 This sensibility was developed under José Luís da Cruz Vilaça’s intervention, as Distinguished 
speaker, in the International Conference More EU Conference – The federal experience of  the European 
Union: past, present and future, held at the Faculty of  Law of  the New University of  Lisbon, 22nd – 23rd 
May 2017, in the panel, in Portuguese, “A União Europeia como sistema federal sui generis: crise e 
desafios recentes”. 
